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In the Supre:me Court of the 
State of Utah 
GENERAL INSURANCE COMPAN:Y 
OF AMERICA, a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
MARK LEWIS, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
No. 7671 
I 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant and respondent cannot wholly agree with 
the statement of facts submitted by the Appellant in his 
brief. That as far as the description of the starting of the 
action and also the description of the insurance policies as 
well as the damages the respondent agrees with. 
On the morning of December 22, 1947, Mr. Park left 
his home in the company with his son, Kenneth W. Park 
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2'· 
aria. a· Bill· Howell (Tr. 13 and .29)' for the purpose of pro-
ceeding to work at the plant of the Geneva Steel COmpany, 
located just west of Orem, Utah (Tr. 10). Mr. Samuel 
Park ·was driving his Studebaker sedan and his son and 
Mr. Howell were riding as passengers in the front seat (Tr. 
13 and 20). They proceeded from Provo, ·Utah, toward 
the said steel plant along Highway 114, which is a two-
lane roadway, orie lane for northbound traffic-and one lane 
for. southbound traffic (T~. 2, 3 and 10). This highway is 
an. improved hard surfaced roadway and runs generally in 
a· north~south direction near th~ steel I>lant (Tr.· 3 and 11). 
A heavy snow was falling;: and ·the ·highway was covered 
with har.d packed snow, and was icy in spots (Tr. 3, 4, 9, 
~9, 24 and 25). ·.· 
· · ·At about 8:40A.M. on this morning, Mr; Park brpught 
his automobile to a ~top,_ f~cing noFth. on sp.id highway at 
a point approximately one quarter of a mile south of the 
Geneva plant (Tr. 3, 11 and 12). That Mr. Park's auto-
m,obile was in rilnable condition at the time of his parking 
on the main portion of the highway (Tr .. 14 and 17). He 
stopped his car in the main traveled portion of the road 
(Tr. 12) ~ That Mr. Park made no effort to pull off on the 
shoulder of the road (Tr. 15). · 
.. , ~r. f.~k an~ his t~o pass~nge~s remained seated in 
t~~. car and after about four or Jive minutes, his. auto~~ .. 
bil~· was struGk from the rear by the defendant, Mark Lewis, 
~iving his 1937 Plymouth Sedan Automobile (Tr. 2, 3, 4~·· 
5i,·, 6, 9, 11, 20 and 24). Immediately prior to this collision, 
the. defendant was on his 'way t~ .work at the Gen~va Steel 
Plant· -and Juid · as passengers in his car, Guy· Lewis and 
Frank Claysotf (Tr. 6). He was driving between 15 arid. 
20 miles per hour arid his car-··was following ·the autorrto-
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3 
bile of one George Armour (Tr. 4 and 25). Armour pulled 
off the highway to the rear of the Park automobile and 
when the defendant applied his brakes on his car, the same 
skidded on the highway, collided with the left side of the 
Armour vehicle and skidded into the rear of the Park au-
tomobile (Tr. 4, 5, 8, 9, 24, 25, 26 and 27). The impact 
against the rear of the Park car caused it to collide with 
the rear of the automobile directly in front of it (Tr. 12, 
13 and 21). The impact of the defendant's car with the 
rear of the Park vehicle was sufficiently severe to tear 
loose the front seat of the Park vehicle and throw Park 
and his two companions into the rear seat (Tr .. 12, 13 and 
20). 
The Court entered judgment in favor of the defendant 
and against the plaintiff Insurance Company, no cause of 
action. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
The respondent will take up the following points which 
are practically the same as appellant and are in the same 
order. 
1. Did the Court err in making and entering Finding 
of Fact No. 7 to the effect "that after Samuel P. Park 
stopped his automobile, he did nothing to warn the de-
fendant or other drivers of other automobiles approaching 
from the south upon said highway and that by failing to 
do so, he was guilty of negligence which contributed to the 
damages sustained to his automobile," for the reason tnat 
said Finding is not contrary to la\V. 
2. Did the Court err in making and entering Finding 
of Fact No. 7 to the effect "that the said Samuel P. P~rk 
failed to move his car off the road onto the shoulder and 
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parked in the lane of traffic, and that by so doing he was 
guilty of negligence which contributed to the damages sus .. 
tained to his automobile," the said finding is supported by 
the evidence and law. 
Is there evidence to support the Conclusion of Law No. 
1, and the judgment of no cause of action? Yes, the 
Court's decision is fully supported by the evidence and the 
law. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The trial Court concluded that the plaintiff's insured 
omitted to do acts that resulted in his contributory negJi .. 
gence. 
The evidence in this case shows that the plaintiff's in .. 
sured stopped in the main lane of traffic upon a highway. 
There is no evidence in the whole. record showing a neces-
sary purpose for the insured to remain there. The car 
was in ninahle condition all the time that he was parked 
on the main' road and blocked traffic. That the defendant 
had a right to proceed along the highway as a reasonable 
prudent man would anticipating that no one would block 
the highway .. The plaintiffs insured had a duty to warn 
approaching cars of the trouble on the highway. This he 
did not do thereby becoming negligent. himself .. 
The ·appellant .in. his brief relies on the case of Reu .. 
ben E. Caperton v. Ben Mast et al, 85 Cal. App. 2nd 157, 
192 Pac. 2nd 467, the plaintiff had a trailer hitched to the 
rear of his car. The facts of this case are dissimilar and · 
not in point to the one appealed here. The facts in this 
cited case were as follows: The defendant had seen the· 
car and trailer for over 600 feet and that the car and ve- · 
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hicle stalled because of a mechanical failure thus making· 
it an emergency stop. This case is not in point. 
The appellant also relies on the case of James E. Smith 
vs. Clinton Webb, 10 S. E. 2d 503, 131 A. L. R. 558, to be 
in point, However, a careful reading of the case will reveal 
that the school bus pulled off to the right to take on a 
passenger from the opposite side of the road. That the· 
vision of the defendant in this case was not obstructed and· 
not only could the defendant see the school bus but also 
the passenger come from the opposite side of the road. 
This case is not in point. 
The appellant also relies on the case of Conrey vs. 
Abramson, 294 Mass. 431, 2 N. E. 2d 203, but again in this 
case the facts are dissimilar. The defendant made a hur-
ried stop in this case and another vehicle coming in back 
of him stopped and a third in which the plaintiff was rid-
ing ran into the second, the· second car rammed the de-
fendant's. The court merely held in that case that defend-
ant was not bound to anticipate that a passenger in the 
third car would be injured. The facts are entirely differ- · 
ent in our case. 
The appellant cites Estes vs. Slater, 3 N. Y. Supp. 2d 
287, 18 N. E. 2d. 690, but a careful reading of this memo-
randum decision would show that hitting a car in. the rear 
was not the. issue. The plaintiff's were proceeding down·: 
the road when they ran into the back of a parked car. 
They proce~ed down ~he roac:l_ ~d pulled off to the side 
then they went back to confer with the owner of the car · 
they had hit. That while standing ·alongside the car the· 
plaintiffs were injured. That this case is an accident be-
tween vehicles and pedestrians. 
The appellant cites Winter vs. Davis, 217 Iowa 424, 
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251_N. w~ 770, 42 C. J. Para. 13, page 613 as holding that 
the temporary stopping on the proper side of the high-.. 
way for a necessary purpose is not negligence. This case 
is not in point with ours in that the plaintiff in the cited 
case had stopped his vehicle over off the street as far as 
he could get and had stopped to clean his windshield. The 
defendant was proceeding in the opposite direction when he 
went diagonally across the road and hit the plaintiff. 
The only conclusion to draw from the appellant's cases 
cited is that they are not in point and that the rules of 
law expounded therein do not apply. 
In general, the question of the pla~tiff's contributory 
negligence presents a question of fact for the jury t~ d~ 
cide upon the basis of all the facts and circwnstances sUr-
rounding the accident. 5 American Jurisprudence, para. 
407 at page 740. 
We respectfully submit that the plaintiff's insured had 
the duty to warn the other motorists using the highway. 
That the whole question of contributory negligence is for 
the trier of the facts and that the evidence in this case 
would hold the plaintiff's insured contributorily negligent. 
POINT II 
The contention of the defendant and respondent is that 
the plaintiff was contributorily negligent in not moving off 
the highway. 
Contributory negligence is usually a fact to be deter-
mined by the trier of the facts. Reuben E. Caperton v. 
Ben Mast et al, 85 Cal. App. 2nd 157, 192 Pac. 2d 467. 
The statute in Utah. would seem to be controlling in 
this case. Quoting from the Utah Code Annotated, 1943, 
57-7-165: 
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''(a) Upon any hi~hway outside of a .. busin.ess or"· 
· _ residez:1ce district no person shall . stop, park, or leave: 
standing any vehicle, whether attended or unatt~nde,9, 
upon the paved or main traveled part of the highway 
when it is practical to stop, park, or so leave such· 
vehicle off such part of said highway, but in every 
event an unobstructed width of the highway opposite· 
a ·standing ·-vehicle shall be left for the free passage of. 
other ·vehicles and a clear view of such stopped . ve- . 
hicle shall be available from a distance of 200 feet in 
each direction upon such highway. 
"This section shall not -apply to the driver of any 
vehicle which is disabled while on the paved or main 
traveled portion of a highway in such manner and _to 
- _._ suc..h. extent that it is impossible to avoid stopping arid 
temporarily ~~~yi~~ ~uch disabled vehicle in such p~ 
sition." 
There can be no doubt in this case that the plaintiff 
by using due CB:re could have pulled his car off the high .. 
way inasmuch as the Armour vehicle pulled off to the rear 
of the Park vehicle (Tr. 4). The evidence is indisputable 
that Park had four to five minutes to accomplish the _act. 
(Tr. 15) . That the Park car was not disabled in any way 
but was in a runable condition (Tr. 14) . 
. Thus under the state law of Utah the pl~tiff's insured 
was contributorily negligent for parkll:lg on a main travel~4-
portion of the highway and there is evidence of thi~ negli- , 
gence and fully suppo~s the court's finding of fact. 
POINT III 
The trial court had the duty to listen to all the· evi-
dence and reconcile the conflicts to arrive at the true· facts., 
That the record is complete to show that Park had the 
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duty to remove his car off the main thoroughfare that by 
not doing so he was negligent. That the record supports 
the trial court's Conclusion of Law No. 1. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that the judgment of the trial 
court was correct and should be affirmed with costs in 
favor of the Respondent. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PAUL J. MERRILL 
Attorney for Defendant and 
Respondent 
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